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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Did the Court of Appeals misapply the facts and issue

a decision in conflict with case law from this Court and another
panel of the Court of Appeals in reaching its decision that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to excuse a
juror for cause who indicated she had been the victim of a similar
crime and evidenced an emotional reaction to that crime?
2.

Did the Court of Appeals reach a decision in conflict

with this Court's decision in State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah
1980), in its determination that the unauthorized contact between
the bailiff and jurors did not raise a presumption of prejudice?

iii

TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Amendment VI to the Constitution of the United States provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury, of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed . . .
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment,
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself;
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.

iv

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GALEN L. JONAS,
Petitioner/Appellant,
v.
Case No.
Priority No. 2

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee.
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

Case No. 880411-CA
Priority No. 2

GALEN L. JONAS,
Defendant/Appellant.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Jonas,
135 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Case No. 880411-CA, filed May 22, 1990), is
attached hereto as Appendix A.

On June 19, 1990, Petitioner timely

filed a Petition for Rehearing in the Court of Appeals.

On June 27,

1990, the Court of Appeals denied Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing.

A copy of that Court's order denying the Petition for

Rehearing is attached hereto as Appendix B.

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion on May 22,
1990.

After timely requesting and receiving an extension of time,

Appellant filed his Petition for Rehearing on June 19, 1990. The
Petition for Rehearing tolled the period in which this Petition for
Writ of Certiorari must be filed.
Appellate Procedure.

Rule 48(c), Utah Rules of

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is

therefore timely filed pursuant to Rule 48, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1988) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp.
1988) .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Theft by Receiving, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) and 76-6-412(1)(b) (1978); Theft by
Receiving, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) and 76-6-412(1)(c) (1978); and Theft by
Receiving, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-6-412(1)(b) (1978), in the Third Judicial District Court in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks,
Judge, presiding.

After a trial held on April 20, 21, 22 and 25,

1988, a jury convicted Mr. Jonas of the three counts and the
Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah rendered final judgment and
conviction.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State charged Mr. Jonas with seven counts of Theft by
Receiving; following a four-day trial, a jury convicted him on three
of those counts.
The charges arose out of a number of incidents involving
a police informant, Jim Prater, and an undercover agent,
Sgt. Illsey.

As the Court of Appeals set forth in its opinion at

3-4, these incidents involved an undercover police officer selling
various items to Mr. Jonas.

The officer was large, with a

distinctive appearance, and had arrested Mr. Jonas in the past.
Mr. Jonas7 defense to the charges was that he knew
officers were setting him up in a "sting" operation, recognized
Sgt. Illsey from the prior arrest, and therefore knew the items were
not stolen.

Mr. Jonas also involved a different officer, Officer

Brown, by requesting that Officer Brown double check that the items
were not stolen and to witness an incident where, according to
Mr. Jonas, undercover agent Illsey was planning to sell drugs.
The jury apparently was persuaded by Mr. Jonas' defense
that he did not believe the items were stolen in assessing the four
later counts and finding him not guilty on those counts.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN FAILING TO EXCUSE PROSPECTIVE JUROR SMITH
MISAPPLIES THE FACTS, IS IN CONFLICT WITH EXISTING
CASE LAW, AND IS IN CONFLICT WITH A DECISION
RENDERED BY ANOTHER PANEL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.

In reaching its decision that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in failing to excuse Juror Smith for cause,
this Court determined that the juror's responses did not raise an
inference of partiality or prejudice.

State v. Jonas, 135 Utah Adv.

Rep. 38, 41-2 (Case No. 880411-CA, filed May 22, 1990).

The Court

focused on the juror's statement that she might be "a little"
influenced if the case involved tools and determined that
This case did not involve tools, so it could be
inferred that the prior experience did not
influence her at all.
Id. at 41. The Court's decision ignores the juror's later statement
that it probably would be difficult for her to be impartial.
40.

Id. at

It also ignores the obvious fact that both the crime in which

the juror had been a victim and the crime before the Court in the
instant case were theft related.

It further fails to take into

account her repeated expressions of concern that she would be biased
and her emotional response to police officers' failure to get the
tools back.

JId. at 40-1.

In State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981), this Court
held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to excuse
for cause two jurors who had been victims of a burglary.

This Court

stated:
Whenever the voir dire evokes a strong emotional
response, there is posed a warning that the juror
may not have a mental attitude of appropriate
indifference to the party or cause before the
court . . . [B]ased on the juror's expressed
feelings, attitudes, and opinions, the trial court
must determine by a process of logic and reason,
based upon common experience, whether the juror
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can stand in attitude of indifference between the
state and the accused.
Id. at 884.
In State v. Suarez. 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (1990), an
opinion issued three days after the opinion in the instant case, a
different panel in the Court of Appeals, comprised of Judges Orme,
Davidson and Billings, reversed a criminal conviction and remanded
the case for a new trial based on the trial judge's failure to
excuse for cause a juror who gave inconsistent responses to similar
voir dire questions in two separate courtrooms.

The defendant in

Suarez filed an affidavit from the defense attorney in another case
which indicated that the juror at issue had indicated in the other
courtroom that he was biased in favor of police testimony.

Relying

on State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 27 (Utah 1984), and State v.
Bailev. 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980), a panel of the Court of
Appeals determined that the juror should have been excused for
cause.

Suarez, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 66.

In Suarez. the juror

indicated to the trial judge that he would not be biased in favor of
police officers.
no bias.

The juror's answer on its face, therefore, showed

The Court of Appeals, however, relied on an affidavit

filed by the defense lawyer in the other case in which the juror had
been questioned to reach its decision that the juror should have
been excused for cause.
Given the statements by the juror in the present case
that it would probably be difficult for her to be fair and her
emotional response to the theft, the result in Suarez should also
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have also occurred in this case.
This Court also determined that even if an inference were
raised, the juror's subsequent responses showed that her concern was
merely the product of a "light impression" and not one that would
"close the mind against the testimony that might be offered in
opposition [citation omitted]."

On the contrary, her final

statement acknowledged her emotional reaction to the incident.
Furthermore, after numerous other statements which indicated an
emotional reaction to the fact the police "didn't do anything" and
that she still had not gotten her possessions back, and a repeated
concern that she might be influenced by the incident, a single
statement by the juror that she believed she could be impartial does
not "attenuate the earlier expressions of bias."

See Jonas, 135

Utah Adv. Rep. at 41 (contained in Appendix A) for transcript of
juror's voir dire response.
As the Utah Supreme Court noted in State v. Jones, 734
P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987), citing State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884
(Utah 1981) :

When a prospective juror expresses an attitude of
bias, a later assertion by the juror that he or
she can render an impartial verdict cannot
attenuate the earlier expressions of bias.
In this case, where the juror stated that she had been
the victim of similar crime and indicated an emotional response to
that prior incident, the trial judge abused his discretion in
failing to excuse her for cause. Mr. Jonas respectfully requests
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t h a t t h i s Court gran I hi 1 . I'M i I inn lm Uli' ml nl iv>rl l o r a r j

on t h i s

issue.

POINT I I . T H E COURT O F APPEALS M I S A P P L I E D T H E
FACTS A N D EXISTING CASE LAW FROM T H I S COURT IN
DECIDING T H A T T H E CONTACT BETWEEN T H E JURORS A N D
BAILIFF D I D N O T RAISE A PRESUMPTION O F PREJUDICE.
Iii t h e instant case, after both p a r t i e s h a d rested b u t
before i n s t r u c t i o n s or rlnniivi

ni.jumtnl . in i< | it'pseiit e.l I

* hi i m / ,

Mini" bdiJift had an unauthorized a n d inappropriate exchange with t h e
jurors.

T h e p a r t i e s h a d rested o

the prfM)iiiH.t

- Friday, a n d over t h e weekend,

.istei nl - iir ...1

i«rts shut dur i nq a highly

p u b l i c i z e d v i d e o store robbery

* bailiff told t h e jurors that

J u r o r D a v i s ' sister h a d been murdered :i n t h e v i d e o store robber 1 y m id
I hit .hii'.u' IVr1.'" i !•; Iitinl IIKM'II excused irom t h e panel
July <i, 198 9 tit 3 - 4 ) -

(Transcript of

The* jurors w e r e n o t aware of t h e information

p r i o r t o t h e bailiff's- liscussion.
DUJing I
on t h e unauthorized contact.

Jonas m a d e a M o t i o n f o r M i s t r i a l based,
; Transcript of April :; *

1988 at 5 ) .

-•

l prejudice

Mr. J o n a s argued that t h e
pi lr suar it t o State v . Pike. 712 P.2d

(Utah 1 9 8 5 ) .

its opinion, t h e Court *

A p p e a l s determined that "the

contact b e t w e e n

^wn

deliberating was an incidental contact raising
prejudice."

presumption of

Jonas, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 43.
In in i

ii|ii.iiii II«I In if i , PHI , J o n a s argued that t h e contact

raised a p r e s u m p t i o n of p r e j u d i c e u n d e r P i k e .

_

7

_

Although there is disagreement as to the
specifics of what the bailiff said to the jurors
in this case ( . . . ) , the information which is
included in the transcript establishes that the
contact between the bailiff and the jurors was
more than brief and incidental and went beyond
mere civilties. At the very least, the bailiff
informed the jurors of the reason that another
juror had been excused. He made them aware that
the juror's sister had been murdered in a highly
publicized incident that had occurred over the
weekend.
The bailiff's action in informing the jurors
of a reason for excusing another juror was outside
his role as a bailiff and went beyond any
permissible contact that might be allowed as part
of his duties in shepherding the jury. The
statement tended to heighten the jurors' awareness
of crime in the community and would give rise to
all of the reactions, fears and concerns that
people feel when considering society's current
level of criminal activity. The nature of the
information was far more intense and of a more
prejudicial nature to a criminal defendant than a
conversation about a bunged toe or a witness'
job. In addition, any follow-up commentary by the
jurors or the bailiff concerning the specific
incident or crime in general, none of which was
recorded but which it is reasonable to assume
occurred, could have a significant prejudicial
impart on a criminal defendant whose case was
currently being tried.
Information to the jurors regarding the
reason for excusing Mr. Davis should have been
carefully controlled. Instead, the bailiff
imparted the information in a completely
uncontrolled situation where Mr. Jonas and his
attorney had no opportunity to hear what was said
and no opportunity to have input or comment on the
information or to object to it being conveyed.
Because the bailiff is viewed by the jury as
an extension of the court and because his position
is that of a court official, his statements carry
great weight. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S.
[363 (1966)] at 365. Furthermore, he has a
responsibility to monitor and control his actions
and statements while in the presence of the jury
so as to not taint them. Since the bailiff's
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contact with the jury as a whole went beyond one
of a brief and incidental nature, a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice was raised by his
unauthorized comments.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 27-8,

This argument Is based on the

facts and circumstances of the instant case and
-tssii

i.-.l merely an

presumption was raised.
The State agreed i n th i s case that the presumption was

raised, stating:
Despite being a brief and a natural outgrowth of
the relationship between bailiff and jury, it is
reasonable to classify the encounter as one in
which a rebuttable presumption of prejudice would
rise.
State's Brief at 45,
Both of the-1 reasons foj. Liu.
i i "lin- (I

* ±j\e,

are applicable t o thi s situation

where the bailiff had unauthorized contact with jurors.

First, it

Is inherently difficult tin pin' a I 11« • effpri ml the i ml »ir I m
inr<ii

and second, the appearance of impropriety causes a

deleterious effect upon the judicial process.
is

Ill

<mi I ' x i e i i ' i i

i

I

I In

i inn I

HI ni ni i I i n ' i ' d i s

Because the bailiff

rin MiublHin

111 a u t h o r i t y ,

he

has a g r e a t e r p o t e n t i a l for impact on .-* -*..>* : *.han many w i t n e s s e s .
T h e Court <-•* A p p e a l s states that
at a] 1 becai is G the
at 43.

T h e facts :

tiaJul not In 1 lit

informatioi

/[here was no pxMhannr1

Jonas, ] 3b l Jtah A d v . R e p .

. • case d o n o t support such a statemer:

bailiff w a s n o t asked a n d d i d n o t volur.tj-r.
t » -

f

: physical reactions made

* ' nrniNt

,

the
•g

response t t h e

.Jonas contends t h a t t h e S t a t e h a d t h e b u r d e n of

establishing lack of prejudice once the presumption arose; the State
failed to establish that the jurors said or did nothing in response,
and this Court erroneously determined that no such exchange occurred.
Although the truth of the bailiff's statement is not at
issue, its impact on the jurors is.

If jurors were discussing high

crime rates or emotional reactions to crime with the bailiff, or
even among themselves, in response to the bailiff's information,
they were impacted by the information.
Mr. Jonas respectfully requests that this Court grant his
Petition for Writ of Certiorari on this issue and determine that the
Court of Appeals erroneously decided that a presumption of prejudice
was raised in this case and that the State failed to rebut that
presumption.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Jonas respectfully requests that this Court grant his
Petition for Writ of Certiorari and review the issues addressed
herein.
SUBMITTED thisCX /

day of July, 1990.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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Chariesworth v. Stale of California

CODE• CO
Provo, Utah

133 Utah Adv. to, 36
ered on appeal. See Zions First Nat'l. Bank v. necessary to determine an appropriate level of
National Am. Tide Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 655 support.
(Utah 1988). The ationale advanced in the dissenting
The trial court remains thwarted in its effort
opinion concerning lack of full inquiry concerning to receive meaningful evidence relative to the
the children's circumstances and appropriateness of
the visitation order, would have equal application in children's circumstances and necessary to its
a separate URESA action, but because of the determination of an appropriate level of perlimited jurisdiction under that act, would clearly be manent child support to be paid by plaintiff.
It remains thwarted in its ability to enforce the
irrelevant.
3. See Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253, 256 (Utah 1987), "reasonable visitation" it also decreed in favor
where the supreme court held that child support of plaintiff. At least in the context of the
payment could not be conditioned upon the noncu- divorce action over which the court has contstodial parent's obtaining visitation. See also inuing jurisdiction-and this is the context
McRcynolds v. McReynolds, 787 P.2d 530 (Utah Ct. in which California chose to raise the issue—
App. 1990) (per curiam).
I think the court has the power and discretion
to balance the parties' respective legal obligORME, Judge (dissenting):
ations in the way it did: Plaintiff has a legal
I take no serious issue with the majority's duty to pay towards the support of his chilview of the law generally applicable to cases dren; defendant has the legal duty to make the
brought under URESA. And I would take no children available for reasonable visitation.
issue with the result my colleagues reach if an Moreover, the court is entitled to consider
independent URESA action had been comm- evidence about the children's circumstances so
enced simply to recover sums paid by Califo- it can get the question of child support out of
rnia for the support of the subject children. "abeyance" and fix as part of its divorce
This is not such a case, however, and accor- decree an appropriate amount for plaintiffs
dingly I do not join my colleagues in reversing discharge of his ongoing support obligation.
the trial court's disposition, which I believe An order directing defendant to make minimal
support payments to be held by the clerk, with
was appropriate under the circumstances.
First, it is important to emphasize that relief disbursement to follow when the children are
was not sought in an independent action. On found, best accomplishes these purposes.
the contrary, a petition bearing the caption
California sought to enforce a support
and case number of the underlying divorce obligation which had advisedly been held in
action was filed in that case on behalf of abeyance. It sought to do so in the context of
defendant Blanca Chariesworth. The petition a divorce action over which the court has
purported to show California as an additional continuing jurisdiction as to a wide range of
defendant although leave of court was neither issues. Whatever might have been appropriate
requested nor obtained to add an additional in the context of an independent URESA
defendant to the underlying action. Accordi- action, the order entered by the court in this
ngly, while California no doubt had a claim divorce proceeding was appropriate and I
ofr any recovery that might be obtained and would affirm it.
clearly was the impetus behind the effort to
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
collect support, the only defendant properly
before the court was defendant Blanca Chariesworth.
Not only did California seek enforcement of
Cite as
support obligation in a pending divorce
135 Utah Adv. Rep. 38
action over which the court had continuing
jurisdiction as a matter of statutory law, see
IN T H E
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(3)0989), but in
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS
addition it chose to pursue the matter in the
context of a case where the court's prior STATE of Utah,
decree had expressly ''held in abeyance until
Plaintiff and Appellee,
the further order of the Court" the issue of
v.
child support. This provision seems to have Galen L. JONAS,
been prompted by defendant's inappropriate
Defendant and Appellant.
action in concealing her whereabouts and that
of the children, as a result of which no mea- No. 880411-CA
ningful evidence could be obtained about the FILED: May 22,1990
children's circumstances and Blanca's ability
to contribute to their support. In addition to Third District, Salt Lake County
being unable to intelligently set a level of Honorable Jay Banks
support payments to be made by plaintiff, the
court no doubt hoped that the lack of support ATTORNEYS:
payments from plaintiff might smoke Blanca Joan Watt, Salt I jl,^ ' ity, I-M appellant
out,, require her to come forward, and permit
the court to have access to the information
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

CODE •co

State v ,Jonas

39
grow-Utth
iy Waft ^,dv. Reo. 38
R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt May.
There was no essential difference in the
Lake City, for Appellee
State's evidence regarding each of the seven
Before Judges Davidson, Jackson, and
transactions. The* police conducted a sting
Larson.1
operation. On each occasion charged, an
undercover police officer sold, and defendant
OPINION
purchased, various merchandise, consisting
principally of equipment and appliances that
JACKSON, Judge:
the police had purchased beforehand or that
Defendant appeals a jury verdict finding was unclaimed evidence in police custody.* In
him guilty of three counts of theft: (1) theft by each instance, the officer posed as a thief or
receiving, a third-degree felony, in violation fence selling stolen goods for about ten cents
of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (Supp. on the dollar. He usually wore an audio rec1989) and §76-6-412(b) (1978), on July 17, order and some transactions were videoreco1985, and (2) on July 30, 1985, and (3) theft rded. These recordings were played and subby receiving, a class A misdemeanor, in viol- mitted to the jury. The police documented the
ation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 goods sold and the monies defendant paid.
(Supp. 1989) and §76-6-412(c) (1978), on
Defendant does not dispute the State's
July 25,1985. We affirm.
evidence. Instead, he claims that he knew the
Defendant seeks reversal of the convictions property, he received in July 1985 was not
or a new trial on five grounds: (1) insufficient stolen. Thus, he asserts that he did not have
evidence; (2) failure to excuse a prospective the culpable mental state that is a necessary
juror for cause; (3) a bailiffs allegedly impr- element of the crime charged. Utah Code
oper contact with jurors; (4) failure of the Ann. §76-6-408(1) (Supp. 1989) provides,
court reporter to provide an accurate transc- with our emphasis:
ript of the evidentiary hearing on a motion for
A person commits theft if he
mistrial; and (5) denial of a motion to recuse
receives, retains, or disposes of the
the trial judge. We will review each of defenproperty of another knowing that it
dant's challenges in turn.
has been stolen, or believing that it
probably has been stolen, or who
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
conceals, sells, withholds or aids in
The standard of review of a jury verdict
concealing, selling, or withholding
challenge based on insufficiency of the evidany such property from the owner,
ence is as follows:
knowing the property to be stolen,
[W]e view the evidence presented
with a purpose to deprive the owner
and all inferences that can be drawn
thereof.
therefrom in the light most favorDefendant testified that he recognized as a
able to the verdict. Where there is
police officer the undercover agent who sold
any evidence, including reasonable
him the merchandise in July 1985. Defendant
inferences that can be drawn from
also testified that he knew before all of the
it, from which findings of all the
transactions that the property was not stolen.
elements of the crime can be made
He claimed that this knowledge was based on
beyond a reasonable doubt, our
information
provided to him by two persons,
inquiry is complete and we will
James
Lawrence
Prater, a confidential police
sustain the verdict.
informant,
and
defendant's acquaintance,
State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10
Officer
Brown.
Defendant
and his wife testi(1989) (citations omitted). Stated another way,
fied
that
Prater
told
them
in
July 1985 about
we will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, viewed the sting operation but said "not to worry
in the light most favorable to the jury's about it, that the merchandise was not
verdict, "'is sufficiently inconclusive or inhe- stolen." Prater had arranged the first meeting
rently improbable that reasonable minds must between defendant and the undercover officer.
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Prater was not available at trial to corroborate
defendant committed the crime of which he or rebut the conversation testimony. On the
was convicted.*" State v. Cobb, 114 P.2d other hand, Officer Brown did testify. Brown
1123, 1128 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. stated that in the fall of 1985, after the July
transactions, defendant told him that he had
Markham, 750 P.2d 599,601 (Utah 1988)).
been introduced by Prater to a man who had
In August 1986, defendant was charged with some damaged warehouse property that he
seven counts of theft by receiving arising out would sell cheap to defendant. Defendant told
of separate transactions in 1985 and 1986. Brown he thought Prater might be an underFour of the transactions occurred in July cover officer or an informant. Defendant's
1985. There were no transactions between July next contact with Brown was on March 29,
30, 1985, and March 4, 1986. The three 1986 1986, when he directed Brown to an anticiptransactions took place in March, April, and ated drug transaction which did not materiaUTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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lize. In May or June 1986, defendant spoke to
MR. YENGICH: -exclude Juror
Brown again. He showed Brown some propNumber-prospective Juror No. 6.
erty and asked Brown to check the national
She is the lady that indicated she
computer system, NCIC, to see if it was
had been burglarized in the past
stolen. Brown remembered seeing an air
and initially said—
compressor, saw blades, and a television.
THE COURT: Ten or twenty years
Defendant also gave Brown some serial
before, wasn't it?
numbers to check out. Brown reported to
MR. YENGICH: Well, I don't
defendant that those items were not stolen.
know. The record will speak to
Brown believed that the checking on NCIC
that. She indicated initially an indwas done before defendant's arrest on August
ication that she did not think she
1, 1986. But police records indicated only one
could be fair and impartial and I at
NCIC check by Brown, on August 14,1986.
the ben[ch] excepted to her as indicating an implied bias of that parDefendant was convicted on the 1985
ticular juror and I used a perempcharges and acquitted on the 1986 charges.
tory challenge to strike her.
The jury could have chosen to disbelieve defTHE COURT: The record may so
endant's story about the 1985 Prater convershow.3
sation, his recognition of the property seller as
a police officer, and his knowledge about the
Defendant's exception was based on tk
status of the property at the time he received it following voir dire colloquy between the trial
in July 1985, even if they accepted defen- court and juror Smith:
dant's and Brown's testimony regarding defTHE COURT: All right. I almost
endant's knowledge or belief regarding the
hate to ask this question, but I'm
unstolen status of the property he received in
obligated to. Have any of you been
1986. The jury, not the appellate court, perfthe victims of a theft? And that, as
orms the function of determining the credibiI've indicated to you before what a
lity of a witness's testimony. State v. Lactod,
theft really is, taking property of
761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). A
another with intent to permanently
person may be convicted of theft by receiving
deprive them, or in receiving. Well,
even if the property is not in fact stolen prowe'll take that first. I saw some
perty, State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169, 1173
hands go up in the jury box
(Utah 1985), if the State proves that the defAll right. Mrs. Smith? I assume all
endant acted under the belief that the property
you women are married unless you
was stolen. Id. at 1172. Unless evidence that
tell me otherwise.
supports the jury's verdict is so insubstantial
P R O S P E C T I V E JUROR D.
that the jury must necessarily have entertained
SMITH: Yes, my husband had
a reasonable doubt that the defendant comabout
$13,000 worth of tools stolen
mitted the crime charged, we are obligated to
about a year and a half ago which
assume the jury believed the evidence which
we have never—
supports the verdict. State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d
THE COURT: Did a criminal act
878, 884 (Utah 1981). Nor will we overturn a
result from that—or action?
conviction merely because the jury chose not
PROSPECTIVE JUROR I)
to believe the defendant. Lactod, 761 P.2d at
SMITH:
No, it was reported to the
27. There is substantial evidence from which
police,
which
they didn't do anytthe jury could reasonably conclude that defehing about, and we still have never
ndant, at the time of the July 1985 transactgottenions, believed that the property was stolen,
THE COURT: They didn'tfindit?
despite his self-serving assertion at trial that
P R O S P E C T I V E JUROR D
he believed otherwise in July 1985. We thereSMITH: (shook head from side to
fore reject defendant's challenge to the jury's
side)
verdict.
THE COURT: How long ago wit
JURY SELECTION
that?
"After the completion of jury \ oir dire,
PROSPECTIVE J URDU ill
SMITH: Aboui .i year and a haJi
defendant challenged one member of the
ago.
venire for cause. Defense counsel, in an unrTHE COURT: Keeping that incieported conference at the bench, excepted to
dent in mind, as I indicated, there
the trial court's denial of that request. The
are different parties involved, but
next day, defense counsel entered his exception
sometimes based on our experience
upon the record in the following form:
we allow that to interfere with our
^ MR . YENGICH: ... I failed-the
thinking.
Court allowed me to take exception
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D
. to the Court's failure t o SMITH:
It might be. If it was
: l
~ THE COURT: Make a record.
tools, I might be a little influenced
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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THE COURT: Well, wait just a
A motion to dismiss a prospective juror for
minute. Let me ask the questions
cause is addressed to the sound discretion of
and you just answer the question.
the trial court. State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D.
459, 462 (Utah 1989). When reviewing such a
SMITH: All right.
ruling, we reverse'only if the trial court has
THE COURT: Bearing that in
abused that discretion by committing harmful
mind, do you believe that that incerror. Id. The general rule concerning abuse of
ident would make it difficult for
discretion is that the appellate court ''will
you to be fair and impartial, partipresume that the discretion of the trial court
cularly to this Defendant, as well as
was properly exercised unless the record
the people of the state of Utah?
clearly shows the contrary." Goddard v.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D.
Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984);
SMITH: It's a little hard to say.
see State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah
THE COURT: Well, you just take
1985). An appellant has the burden of establtime to think it over because we—
ishing that reversible error resulted from an
you're the one thatabuse of discretion. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D.
439,448 (Utah 1988).
SMITH: It probably would, yes.
'A court commits prejudicial error if it
THE COURT: Let's see. You're
forces a party to exercise a peremptory challMrs.enge to remove a prospective juror who should
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D.
have been removed for cause. Gotschall, 782
SMITH: Smith, Donna Smith.
P.2d at 461; State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123,
THE COURT: You don't believe
1125 (Utah 1989); Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451.
that you could sec those facts aside
When comments are made by a juror which
and make a determination on the
facially bring into question that prospective
evidence that's presented in this
juror's partiality or prejudice, an abuse of
case?
discretion may occur unless the court or
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D.
counsel investigates further and finds the infSMITH: I-weil, yes, I believe I
erence rebutted or dismisses the juror. See
could be impartial.
Cobb, 114 P.2d at 1127.
THE COURT: We know you
The Cobb holding suggests a two-part
didn't like to lose the tools.
procedure. When the threshold of apparent
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D.
partiality or prejudice is crossed and an infeSMITH: No, I didn't.
rence arises, the court must determine from
Defendant's objection to prospective juror further inquiry of the venire member whether
Smith is based on Utah Rule of Criminal the inference is rebutted. Thus, our first queProcedure 18(e)(14) (codified at Utah Code stion is: Did Smith's initial comments raise an
Ann. §77-35-18(e)(14) (1982), repealed inference of partiality and prejudice on her
effective July 1,1990), which provides:
part as to this cause or this defendant? We
think not. She stated that the prior theft of
The challenge for cause is an objeher husband's tools might influence her thinction to a particular juror and may
king a little, if this case involved tools. This
be taken on one or more of the
case did not involve tools, so it could be inffollowing grounds:
erred that the prior experience would not influence her at all. As the trial court pressed her
(14) that a state of mind exists on
further, she expressed some concern while
the part of the juror with reference
weighing
her feelings about her ability to be
to the cause, or to either party,
fair but, upon final weighing, she expressed
which will prevent him from acting
affirmative belief in her impartiality. Juror
impartially and without prejudice to
Smith's mild initial responses are in stark
the substantial rights of the party
contrast to those of the two prospective jurors
challenging....
in State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981),
On appeal, defendant contends the trial who crossed the Cobb threshold. They stated
judge committed reversible error by rejecting that their strong adverse emotional responses
his challenge of Smith for cause. In his brief, as former crime victims would affect their
he summarizes this claim of error as follows:
thinking; Smith did not. They identified a
residue of personal trauma which would
The trial judge abused his discretion
compromise their capacity for objectivity;
in failing to excuse Juror Smith for
Smith did not. Their expressed states of mind
cause after she indicated that she
supported an inference that they could not act
had been a victim of a crime similar
with impartiality, defined as "a mental attitude
to the crime charged and that she
of appropriate indifference" in State v.
believed such experience would
Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1977), while
interfere with her ability to be
Smith's expressed state of mind did not
impartial.
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support a similar inference.
Finally, even assuming, <u^uctnioy that
Smith's initial comments raised on their face a
threshold inference of partiality and prejudice,
her subsequent responses to the judge's questioning show her concern was merely the
product of a "light impression" and not one
that' would "close the mind against the testimony that might be offered in opposition."
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451 (quoting State v.
Bailey, 605 P.2d 765,768 (Utah 1980)).
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
grant defendant's request for removal of
Smith from the jury panel for cause.
BAILIFF CONTACT
The parties rested their presentations on
Friday, April 22, 1988, after four days of
trial. The trial court then scheduled jury instruction and closing arguments for Monday
morning, April 25. That weekend, a sister of
juror Davis was shot to death during a
robbery of a local video store. Juror Davis
informed the court on Monday morning that
he could not continue as a juror due to the
fact that his pregnant sister had been murdered. Upon stipulation of counsel, the court
excused Davis from further jury duty and an
alternate juror moved into Davis's place on
the jury. Davis, upon his departure from the
courthouse, asked the bailiff to explain his
absence to the other jurors, and the bailiff
then did so.
Defense counsel, upon learning of the
bailiffs contact with the jury, moved for a
mistrial because the bailiff "did inform them
of that." The court denied the motion without
prejudice. Later, the bailiff was placed under
oath and testified as follows about his contact
with the jury:
(Whereupon, Judge Banks placed
Bailiff HUGH BELL under oath,
who testified as follows:)
THE COURT: State your name.
THE WITNESS: Hugh Bell.
THE COURT: And you are
Deputy Sheriff?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Bailiff < >f this
court?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: This morning at
nine o'clock Mr. Davis came in and
stated reasons to the Court why he
would like to be excused from the
case, and would you tell us the
sequence of events that happened
after he left the chambers?
THE WITNESS: He came into
the courtroom and asked for statement of service on his jury duty and
I went to Joan, found where the
statement was, got her to fill one
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out for him, gave it to him. I
walked to the door and expressed
my sympathy to him and everything, and he asked me if I would
tell the rest of the jurors what
happened, why he was excused.
THE COURT: And what did • •
do?
THE WITNESS: I went in and I
told them that Mr. Davis wouldn't
be in because his sister was the iacfy
that was shot out in West Valley.
THE COURT: Were they discussing the case or the incident at all
when you went in?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: Did you ever hear
them discuss it?
•'THE WITNESS: rhe> didn't
know a thing about it,
THE COURT: All right, > ou may
cross-examine.
MR. YENGICH: No crossexamination.
Defense counsel immediately renewed hi
mistrial motion "on the basis of the record *
Again, his motion was denied.
On appeal, defendant argues that, "b>
orming the remaining jurors that the
court had excused another juror and the
reason for that excuse, the bailiff interfered
with Mr. Jonas' right to a trial by an impartial jury/ guaranteed by the sixth amendment
to the United States Constitution.5 He relies
on the declaration in State v. Pike, 712 P.2d
277, 279-80 (Utah 1985), that "[anything
more than the most incidental contact during
the trial between witnesses and jurors casts
doubt upon the impartiality of the jury and at
best gives the appearance of the absence of
impartiality." In Pike, an important prosecution witness (an arresting officer and eyewitness) engaged three jurors in conversation
about a personal incident. The Utah Supreme
Court concluded that a rebuttable presumption
of prejudice from the juror-witness contact
was established because "the conversation
amounted to more than a brief, incidental
contact and no doubt had the effect of breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly
affect the juror's judgment as to [the
witness's] credibility." Pike, 712 P.2d at 281.
Once such a presumption is raised, the court
reaffirmed, the burden is on the prosecution
to prove that the unauthorized contact did not
influence the juror.4 Id. at 280; see State v.
Erickson, 749 P.2d 620 (Utah 1987); State v.
Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1987),
cert, granted, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1988),
Pike identifies two reasons for the rule that
a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises
from a nonincidentai witness contact with a
juror: (1) the inherent difficulty in proving
how or whether a juror has in fact bee** : ^ rt
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uenced by conversing with a participant in the court pointed out that, "while in a sense the
trial, and (2) the deleterious effect upon the juror's conversation with the trial judge was
judicial process because of the appearance of on a subject connected with the trial," the
impropriety from such contact. Pike, 712 P.2d judge's response was not. Garcia, 355 P.2d at
at 280.
59. Although it would have been improper for
In the instant case, the trial court did not the judge to discuss the issue with the juror,
indicate whether the denial of defendant's the court stated, the judge's actual response
motion was based on a determination that the was proper. Id. The court saw "nothing about
contact was incidental or that the contact was this situation which would tend to prejudice
nonincidental, but the resulting presumption the defendant," distinguishing cases in which
of prejudice was rebutted. On appeal, defen- prejudice was presumed from a contact
dant assumes that the contact between the between a juror and a witness or interested
bailiff and the jurors was presumptively prej- party during the deliberative process. Id.
udicial because it was more than "a brief,
Here, the bailifFs message to the jury had
incidental contact where only remarks of civ- an even more tenuous connection to the
ility were exchanged." Erickson, 749 P.2d at subject of the trial itself than the verbal inte620.
rchange in Garcia. Although it was not uninIn light of the enunciated reasons for the tended, it was not the kind of communication
rule reaffirmed in Pike, we conclude that the which would prejudice the jury's judgment
contact between the bailiff and the jurors regarding their verdict in this case.
before the jury began deliberating was an
The second reason identified in Pike for
incidental contact raising no presumption of presuming prejudice is also absent here. Jurorprejudice. Erickson and Pike and all the other prosecution witness contacts make the entire
Utah cases cited by defendant involved conv- judicial process look collusive or unfair to the
ersational contacts between a juror and a trial defendant. However, unlike verbal contacts
witness. In such circumstances, it is appropr- between jurors and trial participants, verbal
iate to characterize any verbal contact beyond contacts beyond mere civilities between jurors
mere civilities as nonincidental because it and a bailiff, about subjects other than those
might influence the juror's ability to assess connected with the trial at hand, are expected
impartially the credibility of that witness. and unavoidable since the bailiff is assigned to
Jurors should not, as a matter of course, talk minister to the jurors' needs and to be the
to witnesses about the case at hand or about contact person. We do not believe that Pike
anything else. According to Pike, the subst- compels the conclusion that prejudice presuance of any such conversation does not dictate mptively results when a bailiff says anything
application of the presumptive prejudice rule. other than "Hello" or "Good morning" to a
The rule is applied, first, because of the pot- juror at a time when the case has not even
ential for the conversation's subtle effect on been submitted to the jury for deliberations.
the juror's ability to assess the credibility of Compare Utah Code Ann. §77-17-9 (1990)
the trial participant with whom he has conv- (officer in charge of sequestered jury must not
ersed. Here, however, unlike the juror- speak with jury "on any subject connected
witness cases relied upon by defendant, no with the trial") with Utah Code Ann. §77"conversation" took place, in the normal sense 17-11 (1990) (officer in charge of jury in
of an "oral exchange of sentiments, observa- deliberations shall "not permit any person to
tions, opinions, [or] ideas." Webster's Third speak to or communicate with them or to do
Int'l Dictionary 458 (1986). There was no so himself except upon the order of the court
exchange at all because the jurors said ...."); see Still v. State, 484 P.2d 549 (Okla.
nothing. The bailiff merely conveyed inform- Crim. App. 1971) (unauthorized communicaation about why juror Davis would not be tion between bailiff and jury during its delibpresent for the balance of the trial. In addi- erations would raise presumption of prejution, the bailiffs credibility in the eyes of the dice).
jury was not at issue. He did not testify. The
This bailiff did not mingle with the jurors
truth of his statement to the jury was not or converse with them about the trial itself;
relevant.
nor did he interrupt their deliberations. His
We think the facts in this case are more like brief contact concerning something tangential
those in State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 to the trial itself did not give rise to any appP.2d 57 (1960), cert, denied, 366 U.S. 970 earance of impropriety. Thus, the trial court
(1961). In Garcia, the contact occurred at the could have properly concluded that the contact
same stage of the proceedings, i.e., after all was incidental and raised no presumption of
the evidence was in, but before the jury was prejudice.
instructed or the case argued or submitted. A
Because we conclude that the juror-bailiff
juror approached the trial judge and privately contact did not deny defendant his constitutasked if the parties would introduce tapes of ional right to an impartial jury, the trial court
certain testimony. The judge responded that did not abuse its discretion in denying the
he did not know, but would advise counsel request for a mistrial. See State v. Speer, 750
that the juror had inquired. Our supreme P.2d 186 (Utah 1988).
"
UTAH ADVA CE REPORTS

44

State v. Jonas

CODE* CO
Prow, Utah

m Utnh Xdv.frP.38
from several other criminal prosecutions of
MOTION HEARING TRANSCRIPT
dtfeodant *«&& tadgt Baafcs> *K*& ^TO&sutii&%
Defendant claims that his right of appeal attorney.
has been impermissibly impaired because the
The trial judge examined the matter consitranscript of the evidentiary hearing on his stent with the rule, Utah R. Crim. P. 29, and
mistrial motion is incomplete. Defense counsel statutory procedure, Utah Code Ann. §77agrees that the bailiffs contact with the jury, 35-29(c) (Supp. 1989) (repealed effective July
discussed above, was a basis for the initial 1, 1990). The court compared defendant's
mistrial motion,7 which was denied without factual allegations with the court files in each
prejudice. A hearing was later held concerning pjior case. The court records demonstrated
the bailiff-jury contact, at which the only defendant's affidavit to be factually inaccuwitness called to testify was the bailiff. His rate concerning the judge's direct involvement
testimony, fully quoted above, was short and in the several prosecutions, with one excepdirect and comported with defense counsel's tion. The judge found that he had been persreport of the jury contact when stated as the onally involved in only one of defendant's
ground for the initial motion. The bailiffs prior prosecutions. Regarding that case, fudge
testimony concerning the content of his B£nks stated:
message to the jury did not give rise to a
[A] minute entry [is] endorsed on
presumption of prejudice. Thus, the inquiry
the Information showing that * >
ended, and when defense counsel renewed the
my motion to dismiss, an
mistrial motion at the close of the testimony,
others, the only basis for any prejit was again denied. The transcript of the
udice would be that I was the Discourt's inquiry, the bailiffs testimony,
trict Attorney and that people who
counsel's m o tion, and the court's ruling is
appeared in behalf of the State at
complete. That portion of the transcript has
the District Attorney's level were
no fcaps and no indications of unintelligible
my deputies.
words The indication "(illegible)" appears
The
judge concluded that the defendant's
solely in connection with statements of the
court and counsel, which do not form the affidavit was factually insufficient and that
basis for defendant's claim that the jury was prejudice was not shown. The matter was
not impartial. Defense counsel's mistrial referred to another trial judge for review
motion was renewed on the "basis of the pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 29(d). That
judge denied defendant's motion to disqualify
record," i.e., the bailiffs testimony.
The court reporters' transcripts are virtually judge Banks and referred the case back to him
complete and thus amply adequate for us to fox trial.
Defendant has failed to show any actual
review defendant's claims. This transcript is
not like the transcript in State v. Taylor, 664 bias requiring recusal. We consider State v.
PJd 439 (Utah 1983), where a new trial was tfceley, 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah), cert, denied,
ordered. There, a juror's responses to voir 108 S.Ct. 2876 (1988), to be controlling. In
dire questions were totally absent from the Ncclcy, Judge Banks, as prosecutor, had
record and could not be reconstructed. Here, signed some criminal informations against
the bailiffs testimony was totally reported, defendants and had appeared in court in one
and there was no need to reconstruct the c^se to accept a guilty plea. Based on those
record.1 We find the transcript before us to be facts, the court found no actual bias, as reqfunctionally adequate for review. Not all uired, and no grounds for reversal. The Utah
deficiencies or inaccuracies in the record Supreme Court stated:
require a new trial. State v. Perry, 401
Judge Banks determined that he
N.WJM 748, 752 (Wis. 1987). We conclude
had no actual bias against defenthat the condition of the transcripts did not
dant Belt by reason of his involvedeprive d&fcadaat oC due. ptoces& ot oC tfve.
right of appeal guaranteed by Article I, section
twenty years prior. He then foll12 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code
owed the statutorily mandated
Ann. §77-l-6(l)(g) (1990).'
procedure to determine whether
sufficient legal grounds existed to
TRIAL JUDGE RECUSAL
require his disqualification. While it
Defendant filed an affidavit of prejudic*
has been suggested that a trial judge
against Judge Banks, pursuant to Rule 29 of
disqualify himself whenever an
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. He
affidavit of bias and prejudice is
alleged that, twenty years earlier, the judge, as
filed against him in good faith, this
prosecutor, had been forced to dismiss certain
practice is not mandatory.
criminal charges against him. Defendant
claimed -the judge still harbored resentment tfcclcy, 748 P.2d at 1094, Continuing,, me
towards him arising from the dismissal. Def- Court stated:
endant asserted actual bias of the judge
against him, arising from that incident and
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

CODE • C O
Provo, Utah

State v. Green
135 Utah Adv. R « . 45

45

Appellate counsel has not identified a second
ground for our consideration. Trial counsel's affidavit speculates that the purported second ground
might have related to the prosecutor's closing argument. But the transcript of closing arguments is
complete, without gaps, and without indication of
an unintelligible word. Thus, any problem with
argument could be identified by appellate counsel.
Again, none has been directed to our attention.
Moreover, the transcript reveals that defense counsel
did not interpose any objection during the course of
Id.
the prosecutor's argument. Counsel has the unfettIn light of defendant's failure to establish ered opportunity to interrupt at any time and
actual bias or an abuse of discretion, Judge request that any portion of an argument be recoBanks did not commit reversible error by rded, and to voice any objection thereto he may
refusing to disqualify himself as trial judge.
desire. Stare v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918, 921 (Utah
1979). We conclude that the only actual ground for
We affirm defendant's convictions.
the renewed mistrial motion was the bailiffs
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
conduct.
8. Here, the trial court attempted to "settle the
WE CONCUR:
record" due to defendant's claims about omissions.
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
However, those omissions were not related to the
John Farr Larson, Judge
material issues of this appeal as discussed in our
analysis.
1. John Farr Larson, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, 9. Defendant received, at State expense, a full and
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah complete transcript of his trial consisting of several
Code Ann. §78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989).
volumes. He takes no issue with the adequacy of the
2. The merchandise purchased in the seven transac- transcripts except a portion of one volume that
tions was, respectively, (1) Fischer VCR and contains instructions to the jury, closing arguments,
Samsung TV, (2) Toshiba TV, (3) RCA and Magn- and the hearing on the mistrial motion. The court
avox video recorders, (4) three microwave ovens, (5) reporter for these proceedings on the final day of
chain saw, (6) grill, air compressor, and kerosene trial departed the state and could not be located to
lantern, and (7) Fischer VCR.
prepare that part of the transcript. The reporter at
3. Although defense counsel spoke of "implied all other trial proceedings prepared the entire tranbias/ the record indicates that the court and opp- script, utilizing the written notes of the missing
osing counsel understood that the legal basis of the reporter.
challenge to prospective juror Smith for cause was
"actual bias." Subsections (e)(1) through (e)(13) of
Utah R. Crim. P. 18 state grounds of implied bias
or bias at law, i.e., bias arising from status. SubseCite as
ction (e)(14) sets forth actual bias, i.e., bias arising
135 Utah Adv. Rep. 45
from state of mind, as a ground for a challenge for
cause.
IN THE
4. See note 7, infra.
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
5. Although defendant mentions Article I, sections
10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution in his appellate
brief, this issue was neither raised below nor adeq- STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
uately briefed or argued on appeal. We therefore
confine our analysis to the federal constitution. See
v.
State v. Marshall, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 51 n.4 Michael Lewis GREEN, aka James Alvin
(Ct. App. 1990).
Douglas,
6. This rule has its Utah roots in State v. Thome, 39
Defendant and Appellant.
Utah 208, 117 P. 58 (1911), in which two officers
took the jury to lunch at a public hotel in the midst
of their deliberations. One juror and one officer left No. 890222-CA
the group and the juror talked to someone on the FILED: May 23, 1990
telephone. The record did not show whom the juror
talked with or what was said. The court concluded:
First District, Box Elder County
Honorable Gordon J. Low
From the conduct disclosed and the
exposure of the juror to harmful influATTORNEYS:
ences, prejudice is presumed, and the
Daniel R. Knowlton, Salt Lake City, for
burden cast on the state to show what
Appellant
the communication was, and that it was
harmless and could not have influenced
R. Paul Van Dam and Barbara Bearnson, Salt
or affected the deliberations of the juror
Lake City, for Appellee
or his verdict,
Before
Judges Bench, Greenwood, and
/d., 117 P. at 66.
7. Defendant's trial counsel filed an affidavit stating Jackson.
that he * thinks'' he might have had a second ground
for the renewed mistrial motion. If so, that ground
would appear in the transcript of the proceedings.
But, while we recommend the practice that a judge recuse himself
where there is a colorable claim of
bias or prejudice, absent a showing
of actual bias or an abuse of discretion, failure to do so does not
constitute reversible error as long as
the requirements of section 77-3529 [Utah R. Crim. P. 29] are met.
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